Cross-Strait & Security
All Articles · 5
The Philippines' Double Signal: If the Taiwan Strait Erupts, Is EDCA Strategic Depth or a Political No-Go Zone?
Marcos says, on one hand, that the Philippines will not become a springboard for a US attack on China — and, on the other, admits it cannot stay out of a Taiwan Strait crisis. EDCA's real significance is that capability has already been built, while specific activities remain subject to Philippine approval and bilateral mechanisms.
Kinmen and Matsu's Quasi-Integration: How Water Supply, Transport, and Cross-Strait Policy Are Amplifying the Outlying Islands' Resilience Test
Kinmen's water transfer from Fujian, the rebound in Mini Three Links traffic, and Fujian's integration policy are forcing outlying-island governance to face both livelihood convenience and single-source risk at once. The verifiable question is not whether the islands have 'already been taken over,' but how to make backup supply, transport, and commercial options more resilient.
The Drone Army That Got Cut: Taiwan's Special Defense Budget Loses Nearly Two-Fifths — Can the Quills Still Grow?
The Legislative Yuan cut the special defense budget act's spending cap from NT$1.25 trillion to NT$780 billion. The version passed in May left out several originally planned domestic uncrewed platforms, joint Taiwan-US R&D, and part of the integrated air-defense capability. Is this democratic oversight, or a delay in building combat power?
The First Island Chain Lights Up All at Once: Three Things Taiwan Really Needs to Understand Behind the Show of Force
In June and July 2026, established exercises such as KAMANDAG, Valiant Shield, and RIMPAC overlapped across the Western Pacific; RIMPAC alone drew 30 countries and 30,000 personnel. A show of force is not a commitment to come to Taiwan's defense — Taiwan still has to focus on its own command, mobilization, and social resilience.
Cooling Down or Shifting Gears? The Puzzle of Declining Military Pressure in the Taiwan Strait
In the first half of 2026, public statistics show a decline in PLA air activity around Taiwan; but shows of force, coast guard activity, and blockade-control drills still need to be watched together. A drop in sortie counts alone can only prove that air activity has decreased — it cannot, by itself, prove that overall threat has declined.