The EU's Taiwan Pivot: From Polite Silence to Strategic Concern, Brussels' New Calculus on the Taiwan Strait

On 29 February 2024, the European Parliament's plenary session passed a resolution on the Taiwan Strait by an overwhelming majority. The resolution's language was not fierce, but its very existence was a signal: Europe's highest legislative body had formally placed "military provocations in the Taiwan Strait" on its agenda, explicitly naming China's coercive behavior as deserving international condemnation ^[2].

This was not the first Taiwan-related resolution the European Parliament had passed, but both the frequency and the intensity have risen noticeably in recent years. That October, the European Parliament passed another resolution calling on the UN General Assembly to revisit the interpretation of Resolution 2758, opposing China's reading of the resolution as a legal basis for the claim that "Taiwan is part of China" ^[3].

In the lexicon of Chinese diplomacy, European Parliament resolutions carry no direct legal force. But in Taiwan's diplomatic reality, this "warming of language" represents a small expansion of political space — a way for EU-Taiwan relations to accumulate mutual trust by other means, beneath the ceiling set by the One-China policy.

The slow pivot now under way in Brussels is driven by three forces: anxiety over geopolitical security, the urgent need for supply-chain resilience, and a recalibration of strategy toward China. This article traces where these three forces come from, where they now stand, and how Taiwan should read the meaning and the limits of this pivot.

Understanding any diplomatic relationship starts with its underlying structure of interests. The scale of EU-Taiwan bilateral trade is already large enough that Brussels takes Taiwan seriously.

The European Commission's press release on the Trade and Investment Dialogue states: EU-Taiwan goods trade stood at €78.3 billion in 2023, making Taiwan the EU's 13th-largest goods trading partner; by Taiwan's own statistical measure, the EU is Taiwan's third-largest export destination and fifth-largest source of imports ^[1][4]. An earlier draft of this article mischaracterized the EU's ranking as seventh; that has now been corrected against the official data. Different agencies may use goods only, goods plus services, or different settlement periods, so totals and rankings can vary slightly and should not be treated as one continuous series.

This structure has shifted markedly over the past five years. As Taiwan-U.S. trade has surged (Taiwan's exports to the U.S. exceeded 23% of its total exports in 2025) and Taiwan-China trade's share fell from a peak of 43.9% in 2020 to around 35% in 2023 ^[1], the EU's role has grown more important: it is Taiwan's natural choice for diversifying geopolitical risk, and one of Taiwan's most important sources of high-end equipment and technology.

Taiwan's exports to Europe are dominated by semiconductors (integrated circuits, semiconductor manufacturing equipment parts), machine tools, computer hardware, and medical devices. Europe, in turn, exports aircraft (Airbus), auto parts, chemicals, and semiconductor manufacturing equipment to Taiwan — the last category epitomized by the Netherlands' ASML, whose exports to Taiwan alone have exceeded several billion euros in some years.

The "political thermometer" of EU-Taiwan relations can be read through several indicators: the frequency and seniority of European parliamentarians' visits to Taiwan, the number and rhetorical intensity of European Parliament resolutions touching on Taiwan, and the density of public statements by EU officials.

Over the past four years, all three indicators have been trending upward.

Parliamentary Exchanges and Resolutions

A European Parliament delegation visited Taiwan in 2021, and parliamentary exchanges have continued in the years since ^[5]; but this round of research found no official documentation to support the claim that "Metsola led a delegation to Taiwan in 2022" or the figures of "22 members in 2023, more than 30 in 2024," so that account has been removed. What can be confirmed by official documents is that the European Parliament sharpened its language on Taiwan in its February 2024 Common Foreign and Security Policy resolution and its October 2024 Resolution 2758 ^[2][3]. Parliamentary resolutions carry political signal; they are not equivalent to a commitment of security involvement by the European Commission or member states.

Trade and Investment Dialogue

In December 2024, the third EU-Taiwan Trade and Investment Dialogue was held in Brussels, with an official agenda covering trade and economic security, supply chains, and investment ^[4]. This shows the two sides now have a repeatable institutional dialogue; but it does not follow that every detail absent from the official press release has already been agreed, still less that a formal investment agreement has entered negotiation.

ETIA: The Possibility — and the Ceiling — of an EU-Taiwan Investment Agreement

Both Taiwan and the EU have expressed interest in exploring the possibility of an EU-Taiwan Investment Agreement (ETIA). Taiwan's logic is to lock in investment rules against the risk that Europe might yield to Chinese pressure in the future; Europe's logic is to provide legal certainty for bilateral investment and lower friction costs. But ETIA's biggest obstacle is not technical negotiation but the political framework: any formal agreement naming "Taiwan" as a contracting party must confront the question of its legal compatibility with the EU's "One-China policy." This is not a knot that can be untied in the short term ^[7].

If European Parliament resolutions are "verbal action," then the Netherlands' controls on ASML export licensing are, so far, the most consequential "substantive action" Europe has taken in the Taiwan Strait contest.

Starting in September 2023, the Netherlands introduced national export licensing for certain advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment; in September 2024 it brought some DUV equipment into scope as well ^[8]. The Dutch government has stated explicitly that the regime is a case-by-case licensing review, not an export ban. An earlier draft's characterization of this as "almost cutting off supply of the most advanced equipment" was therefore an overgeneralization; it should instead read as "raising the licensing threshold for certain equipment exported to China."

The geopolitical significance of this move is that the Netherlands is now a direct participant in semiconductor technology controls, not a bystander. That said, the Dutch official rules apply to the export of specific controlled equipment and do not grant Taiwan a blanket regulatory "exemption." This round of research also found no official documentation to support an "advanced semiconductor equipment alliance" or treat remote shutdown capability as an established policy tool, so those claims have been removed.

The EU Chips Act, which took effect in 2023, sets a policy target of at least 20% of global chip production value by 2030; the EU's own account states it expects to mobilize more than €43 billion in policy-driven investment ^[9]. This is not a single lump sum equivalent to a cash subsidy; an earlier draft's phrase "€43 billion subsidy" has been changed to the more precise "policy-driven investment."

The premise behind this target carries a message that is complicated for Taiwan: Europe believes its own dependence on Taiwan is too high and needs to "diversify."

The Chips Act's "de-risking" orientation will heighten Europe's sensitivity to supply concentration; TSMC's Dresden investment shows there is indeed a physical basis for EU-Taiwan industrial cooperation. But the claim that "Europe originally had no advanced-process capability at all" ignores differences in process node, product type, and existing fabs, and cannot be treated as a blanket fact. This article therefore retains only the narrower, verifiable judgment: Europe wants to reduce supply concentration, while still needing investment and technology cooperation from Taiwanese firms.

The State: Make Use of the Warming Language, But Don't Overcommit

The EU's strategic pivot is real, but its speed and scope are both constrained structurally. Germany's and France's dependence on trade with China (Germany's exports to China are the EU's largest) and the legal framework of the One-China policy mean the EU is unlikely to cross the red line of "official relations" in the short term. Taiwan's strategy should be to keep accumulating "unofficial" mutual trust, lock in progress through institutionalized dialogue mechanisms (the Trade and Investment Dialogue, exploratory ETIA talks), and pursue differentiated diplomacy within the EU by leveraging the gap between the Nordic and Eastern European countries (the wing more wary of China) and Germany and France. (Observation; high confidence)

Industry Intermediaries: Make Yourself an Indispensable Part of Europe's Supply-Chain Resilience Plans

Europe is looking for reliable suppliers that are "not China" in critical raw materials, semiconductors, and green-energy equipment. Taiwan's capabilities in semiconductor manufacturing, precision machinery, and electronics assembly fit Europe's diversification needs well. Taiwanese firms and think tanks should participate more actively in the EU's "strategic partnership procurement" initiatives, positioning Taiwan as a solution to Europe's de-risking from China rather than a potential Taiwan Strait risk. (Observation; medium confidence)

SMEs: Entering the European Market Is Costly, But Worth It

The main challenges Taiwanese SMEs face in the European market are regulatory hurdles (CE certification, GDPR, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, CBAM) and language barriers. But the European market's higher price bands and better payment reliability make it a rational choice for diversifying risk, compared with the price wars of the Chinese market. TAITRA's network of offices in Europe, and marketing subsidies for European markets from the SME administration, are concrete tools of support already available. (Observation; medium confidence)